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The papers and presentations at the seminar covered a wide range of topics and can be found online at the 
TJN blog.
Speakers at the event included Kerrie Sadiq, 
Tatiana Falcão, and Vikram Vijayaraghavan, 
whose talks formed the basis for three articles 
published here.   All three argued that the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations do not 
introduction/Summary 
The Helsinki Seminar on Transfer Pricing         1
David Spencer
FEaturES 
Giving Developing Countries a Say in  3 
International Transfer Pricing Allocations
Tatiana Falcao 
Arms Length Pricing and Multinational  5 
Banks: An Old Fashioned Approach 
in a Modern World
Kerrie Sadiq
The Great Indian Transfer Pricing Circus:  7 
A Critical View of Indian TP Provisions 
Vikram Vijayaraghavan
Corporate Transparency:  
Will Dodd-Frank Rules about Reporting  10 
by Extractive Industries Lead to More 
Extensive Country-by-Country Reporting?
David Spencer
FinanciaL SEcrEcy indEX, 2013
First Steps Towards FSI 2013 13
Moran Harari and Markus Meinzer
BooK rEViEW
A Dictionary of Taxation 14
John Christensen
nEWS in BriEF 15
Guest Editor: David Spencer
Contributing Editors: John Christensen and Nick Shaxson
Editor: Dan Hind
Design and layout: www.tabd.co.uk
Email: info(at)taxjustice.net  
Published by the Tax Justice Network 
November 2012
© Tax Justice Network 2012 
For free circulation, ISSN 1746-7691
tHE tranSFEr PricinG Edition
 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 3
tHE HELSinKi SEminar  
on tranSFEr PricinG
In June 2012 the Tax Justice Network organized a seminar in Helsinki on alternative 
methods of transfer pricing, which was co-sponsored by the Government of Finland 
and KEPA, the Finish civil society umbrella organization. 
adequately address current transfer pricing 
problems, and they suggested alternatives.
Tatiana Falcão, a Brazilian tax attorney, in 
“Giving Developing Countries a Say in 
International Transfer Pricing Allocations” 
provides a brief introduction to transfer 
pricing for readers new to the subject, 
describes the OECD’s approach and then 
outlines the Brazilian system, which is based on 
fixed margins and safe harbors.
In “Arm’s Length Pricing and Multinational 
Banks:  An Old Fashioned Approach in a 
Modern World”, Kerrie Sadiq, an Australian 
attorney, describes the high level of integration 
of multinational financial institutions and argues 
that treating each element within a given 
operation as a separate entity for transfer 
pricing purposes is not economically or legally 
realistic. She proposes instead formulary 
apportionment as a device for managing this 
complexity.
In “The Great Indian Transfer Pricing Circus 
– A Critical View of Indian TP Provisions”, 
Vikram Vijayaraghavan, an Indian tax attorney, 
points out the weaknesses of the Indian 
transfer pricing system, and suggests (a) sector-
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wide safe harbors, (b) the use formulary 
apportionment, and (c) the streamlining of 
current Indian TP provisions.
I have written the fourth feature article in 
this issue of Tax Justice Focus, “Corporate 
Transparency:   Will the Dodd-Frank Rule 
about Reporting by Extractive Industry 
Companies Lead to More Extensive 
Country-by-Country Reporting?” This 
summarises Section 1504 of Dodd Frank 
and the Rule issued by the SEC. It describes 
the reporting requirements of each resource 
extraction company publicly listed in the 
United States as required by the Dodd-
Frank legislation. Resource extraction 
companies have to publish information about 
payments to foreign governments (including 
taxes). This is a significant disclosure 
requirement, but is much narrower than the 
disclosure requirements that country-by-
country (“CBC”) reporting would require. 
Nevertheless, section 1504 and the SEC 
regulations might be a significant step toward 
CBC Reporting, especially if the issues raised 
by it create additional momentum for other 
governments and the EU to adopt similar 
legislation and regulations.
David Spencer 
Senior Adviser,  Tax Justice Network    
“Kerrie Sadiq, Tatiana Falcão, and Vikram 
Vijayaraghavan argued that the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines do not adequately address 
current transfer pricing problems, and they suggested 
alternatives.”
Corporate tax avoidance, front page news again
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Transfer pricing refers to attempts to attribute a market price to a related party transaction.
Different countries will have different 
rules as to what they class as related party 
transactions, but to put things simply, a 
related party transaction is classically 
between a head office and its subsidiaries, or 
between companies belonging to the same 
multinational group. State efforts to regulate 
such transactions date back to a set of rules 
drafted by the US government in 1921.1 
It is important to attribute a market price (i.e. 
the same price that would be applied by non-
related parties operating under regular market 
conditions), because related party transactions 
1 Transfer Pricing Regulations, or the overall objective 
of trying to forestall price manipulation, has been 
present in the USA’s legislation since the War 
Revenue Act of 1917.  However, the earliest direct 
predecessor of the US Transfer Pricing Regulation as 
it is known nowadays (section 482), dates from 1921. 
For further information, see Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., 
“The Rise and the Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of the U.S. International Taxation,” Virginia 
Law Review 1995 No.1 p.89-159 (BR-USA-1997-28)  
feature
Tatiana Falcão
GiVinG dEVELoPinG countriES a Say 
in intErnationaL tranSFEr PricinG 
aLLocationS
The Brazilian approach to transfer 
pricing has important lessons for 
other emerging economies.
can shift income or expenses, and therefore 
profits, from one jurisdiction to another, and 
hence avoid the payment of taxes. 
Profit shifting schemes usually occur between 
a high tax and a low tax jurisdiction. Suppose, 
therefore, that Multinational Company X 
(“MCX”) is located in an OECD member 
country, where it is subject to 35% 
corporation tax. MCX has a subsidiary in 
a developing country, Subsidiary Company 
Y (“SCY”), where it acquires all the raw 
materials needed for its manufacturing plant 
in the OECD Country and is subject to 
10% corporation tax. Without the existence 
of transfer pricing rules, SCY Co could 
overcharge for the sale of raw materials to its 
headquarters, MCX, hence shifting the profits 
to the low tax jurisdiction. 
Likewise, if MCX were in need of additional 
funds in order to renovate its manufacturing 
plant in the OECD country, SCY could 
be tempted to under-price the sale of raw 
materials to MCX, hence stripping the 
developing country of the profits that would 
be taxable there, and keeping the profits 
for reinvestment in the OECD country. By 
issuing transfer pricing regulations, countries 
regulate how related companies price their 
inter-company transactions, by defining the 
criteria they should use in order to come 
to a market price arrangement. This market 
price arrangement is technically referred to 
as an arm’s length price. 
Transfer Pricing regulations have come a long 
way since 1921. In 19792 the OECD began to 
identify the main problems associated with 
related party transactions in two document 
entitled “Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises” and “Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administration” (“OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines”). The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as we know them are a great 
improvement from the 1979 document, as the 
OECD (through the work of the secretariat of 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs) has gone on 
to design a “model scheme” originally meant 
for its member countries to adopt when 
issuing their own transfer pricing regulations.
2 The 1979 document is a report. This report was 
approved in its original version by the Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and by the OECD 
Council for publication on 13 July 1995. Since its 
publication, the Guidelines have been supplemented 
by several other reports on different aspects of 
transfer pricing. The Guidelines have also been 
substantially updated and modified. For more 
information, see “OECD Transfer pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
and Transfer Pricing Features of selected countries,” 
Kamish Susarla and Antoine Glaize (editors), IBFD, 
2010 edition, pgs. 3 and 4. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were a 
great idea. They established an understanding, 
between countries3 that shared similar 
economic conditions and were at a similar 
stage of development, as to what was necessary 
in order to stop their corporate taxpayers 
from shifting profits from their (high taxing) 
jurisdictions, to other (low taxing) States. 4 
Developed countries could afford to require 
companies to search for comparable 
transactions with unrelated parties, in order 
to demonstrate the price parity between 
3 In 1979, the following countries were OECD 
members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, The Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The 
United Kingdom and the United States. As per 
“Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises 
Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs,” 
IBFD Archives, 1979.
4 In July 1995, when the Report was published, 
the following countries were OECD members: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The United Kingdom 
and the United States.  This means that (with 
the exception of the admittance of Mexico), the 
membership was unaltered from what it was in 1979.  
See in that respect http://www.oecd.org/general/
listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventi
onontheoecd.htm, accessed 5 September 2012.
THIRD QuaRTeR 2012  Volume 7 Issue 3 TAX JUSTICE FoCus
4
related and unrelated party transactions. 
Similarly, they could require companies to 
provide an analysis of the assets used and 
risks assumed by each of the related parties 
in the related party transaction (that is, to 
account for the factual differences between 
their related party transaction and the 
paradigm comparable transaction in order 
to account for the difference in the price). 
Given that the world’s industrial production 
was (and still is) largely concentrated in the 
northern hemisphere, states imposed these 
obligations on companies because they knew 
they had the resources to run through that 
abstract exercise and provide the information. 
Similarly, governments were aware they 
would have the funds to hire and train tax 
officials to assess how the methodologies 
were being applied.
Since then developed countries have 
become much more dependent on trade 
with developing countries, especially in 
order to access natural resources. This 
interdependency created a need for OECD 
member countries to spread “their” approach 
to transfer pricing to developing countries. 
But they want developing countries to apply 
the OECD “authorized” transfer pricing 
approach even though governments there 
lack the resources to assess the correct 
application of the rules. They are sending the 
priest without having taught him the sermon.
Developing countries applying the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines are therefore 
faced with the difficult task of trying to 
implement rules that are not fit for their 
economic or juridical environment. The first 
lesson a law student learns is that a country’s 
juridical environment and legal archetype are 
a reflection of its society and its customs. 
How can a tax system designed to reflect 
the economic and business environment of a 
few very well developed countries be applied 
in countries with a different economic 
conjuncture, at a different developmental 
stage, and with different socio-economic 
priorities? The OECD wants its Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines to be embraced by 
developing countries, but it does not want 
to adapt them to developing countries 
conditions. 
This is where Brazilian transfer pricing rules 
come in. Brazil has developed a system 
that allows the taxpayer to mathematically 
determine and prove its pricing benchmark 
without having to go through a search for 
comparables. By not requiring a comparables 
search—which is the basis of the OECD’s 
transfer pricing guidelines, the Brazilian 
transfer pricing rules provide a viable 
alternative to the OECD guidelines.
The search for comparables is one of the 
main concerns of developing countries, 
which do not have wide and open markets 
providing accessible information and reports 
about competing companies commercializing 
comparable or similar products. Sometimes, 
a company might be the only producer of 
a specific type of product, making the 
search for comparables impracticable if not 
impossible.
In addition, one of the main issues in the 
OECD’s transfer pricing approach that has 
been resolved by the Brazilian method is the 
need to search for concurrent prices. Because 
the markets in developing countries tend to 
be concentrated with only a reduced number 
of players, current participants and also new 
entrants to the market might not be able 
to access the prices of the products sold 
by other companies. For some companies, 
price strategy has a direct correlation with 
competitiveness. Brazilian tax authorities, 
by adopting fixed profit margins over the 
company’s own applied production or resale 
price, managed to develop a method based on 
the company’s own data, thereby removing the 
need of acquiring new data from the market.
Brazil aims to achieve the arm’s-length 
standard by using a series of safe harbors and 
fixed formulas that are made available to the 
taxpayer for import and export transactions.5
Brazil has developed a system providing 
juridical certainty. For developing countries, 
whose tax laws tend to be inconsistent and 
burdened by bureaucracy, the development 
of an objective method is a significant benefit, 
reducing the risk of an assessment by the tax 
authorities.
The Brazilian transfer pricing rules could 
serve as a basis for other developing 
countries to issue their own transfer pricing 
rules and that is what I sought to argue at 
the Helsinki seminar in June as well as in 
this article. There is an option. Whatever the 
result of this ongoing debate, the message is 
clear: it is no longer 1979. 
Tatiana Falcão is a Brazilian lawyer specialising 
in tax and economic development. She has 
worked as a consultant for the United Nations 
and the Brazilian government and currently 
works at IBFD. This article reflects the author’s 
personal opinion.
5 Safe harbor is the term used to describe a simple 
set of rules under which the transfer pricing method 
could be automatically accepted by a national tax 
administration without having to search the market 
for comparables.
“The Brazilian transfer pricing 
rules could serve as a basis for 
other developing countries to 
issue their own transfer pricing 
rules.”
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Internationalisation and globalisation mean that the problems associated with the taxation of multinational entities (MNEs) 
raise key financial and economic issues for 
government around the world.
Taxing multinational entities is not new and 
the arm’s length concept, as the solution to 
transfer price manipulation, has existed for 
nearly a century. However, the traditional 
tax regime has simply not kept pace with the 
evolution of the MNE, rendering it ineffective 
in taxing many modern businesses according 
to economic activity. One such example is 
the modern multinational bank (MNB) which 
is increasingly undertaking more globalised 
and complex trading operations. MNBs are 
highly integrated and the services provided 
are not easily attributed to any particular 
jurisdiction – the basic requirement of the 
arm’s length price.
feature 
Kerrie Sadiq
arm’S LEnGtH PricinG and muLtinationaL 
BanKS: an oLd FaSHionEd aPProacH in a 
modErn WorLd*
How can national tax authorities deal with banks that operate a global 
trading model?
As early as 1984 the OECD recognised that 
“the transactions between the various parts 
of an international banking organisation are 
so frequent and so complex that the problem 
of deciding to which particular part of the 
organisation a particular element of the total 
profit should be related for tax purposes often 
becomes one of considerable difficulty”.1 
Further recognition of the problem came 
about in 1998 when the OECD released 
its report “Taxation of Global Trading of 
Financial Instruments” and again in 2001 with 
its discussion draft “Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments” in which Part II 
specifically dealt with banks. Although the 
2010 OECD Report “Attribution of Profits 
to Permanent Establishments” once again 
acknowledged these difficulties in the financial 
sector, the authorised approach remains that 
profits attributed to a branch are profits 
that the branch would have earned at arm’s 
length, that is, as if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise.
1 OECD Transfer Pricing and Multinational Entities – 
Three Taxation Issues, 1984.
Maintaining this old approach in new 
conditions means that some jurisdictions 
do not receive their fair share of tax. Tax 
minimisation becomes achievable to modern 
MNEs such as banks because of their 
unique traits.  This is achieved through the 
exploitation of the traditional source and 
transfer pricing regime, which results in a 
jurisdictional distribution of taxing rights 
which does not reflect the location of 
economic activity. 
MNBs provide unique services and 
consequent products. Unlike traditional 
MNEs, banks undertake an intermediary 
role in the marketplace and enjoy synergistic 
gains because of their expansion to meet the 
needs of existing clients. MNBs also benefit 
from monopolistic advantages and network 
linkages. In addition to these unique features, 
the organisational structure MNBs adopt is 
often unique. While trading structures may 
vary from a separate enterprise model to an 
integrated trading model, it is the latter which 
is the more prevalent mode of operation. 
Consequently, MNBs are operating on a true 
global trading model in which the primary 
concern is not location, but rather time zone. 
All of a bank’s functions can be performed in 
any of its locations, at any given time, and will 
be performed wherever the market is open.
There is a solution. If we accept that the unique 
nature of MNBs results in the traditional 
arm’s length method failing to recognise the 
economic reality of the circumstances in which 
they operate, we can turn to a unitary model 
based on global formulary apportionment. 
Formulary apportionment does not attempt 
to undertake a transactional division of a 
highly integrated MNE, but rather, it allocates 
income to the relevant jurisdictions based on 
an economically justifiable formula. Critics 
of formulary apportionment often point to 
the difficulty associated with international 
consensus but this does not detract from its 
theoretical soundness. To that end, I suggest 
that there are five theoretical benefits of a 
unitary tax model for MNBs.
Formulary apportionment reflects economic 
reality. This method looks to the economic 
* A full length version of this article was published in 
the Journal of International Taxation (2011) Vol 22(5) 
46 (Part 1) and Journal of International Taxation 
(2012) Vol 23(2 )54 (Part 2). 
“A unitary tax model is optimal for taxing banks, which today 
account for a very considerable percentage of global profits.”
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activity of the MNB rather than the organization 
of the enterprise.  It accepts that the MNB is ‘an 
indivisible whole’, that is, the entity is so highly 
integrated that it cannot be divided into smaller 
component parts with any degree of accuracy.
Formulary apportionment reflects integration. By 
ignoring the separate parts of the multinational 
entity, the formulary apportionment model also 
ignores the entity’s legal structure, making the 
structure adopted meaningless for tax purposes, 
just as it is meaningless for purposes of management 
decisions.  Instead, the formulary apportionment 
model looks to the economic substance of the 
multinational entity and, in this sense,  adopts a 
substance-over-form approach.
Formulary apportionment reflects internalization. 
Internalization theory (why firms become 
multinational, for example, benefiting from 
synergies) means that the arm’s-length standard 
does not accurately represent why an entity 
becomes multinational. This same theory may be 
used to demonstrate that the unitary tax model 
is consistent with economic reality.
Formulary apportionment is consistent with the 
aim of efficient operations. The aim of any MNB 
is profit maximization, and it is the responsibility 
of management to ensure that this occurs,  so 
resources will be allocated to the location that 
ensures this profit maximization. Consequently, a 
tax model that allocates income consistently with 
management policy is economically sound and 
theoretically superior. Formulary apportionment 
allocates income to the place of the economic 
activity by recognizing the factors that contribute 
to the overall profits of the entity, consistent with 
management policy.
Formulary apportionment distributes rights 
through an equitable model. A system that 
distributes taxing rights equitably between the 
relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country 
receives its fair share of tax revenue. A jurisdiction 
will receive its fair share when the tax model 
reflects the economic activity undertaken in a 
jurisdiction. The economic activity undertaken 
in a jurisdiction is reflected under a formulary 
apportionment model via the specific factors in 
the formula, along with the relative weighting. 
Arguably, there are also ancillary benefits. A 
formulary apportionment regime may provide 
such practical benefits as greater certainty, 
improvements in tax compliance due to 
increased simplicity, and a reduction in avoidance. 
A unitary tax model is optimal for taxing banks, 
which today account for a very considerable 
percentage of global profits. 
The theoretical advantage of formulary 
apportionment offering an equitable regime 
because taxpayers pay their fair share of tax 
is juxtaposed with the practical advantage of 
reducing the opportunities for income shifting. 
A final advantage to formulary apportionment, 
which is also a consequence of this model 
achieving greater inter-nation equity, is that it 
eliminates the possibility of double taxation. The 
tax base to be divided between the relevant 
jurisdictions is never more than 100% of taxable 
profits.
Kerrie Sadiq is a Professor at the School of 
Accountancy, QUT Business School, Queensland 
University of Technology and an Adjunct Senior 
Research Fellow, Faculty of Business and Economics, 
Monash University.
Transnational banks can all too easily conceal where their profits are actually sourced 
Photo: John Christensen
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The year 1991 was a watershed in modern India’s economic history; it was the year in which the Indian 
economy was ‘opened up’ or liberalized 
by the then widely-hailed Finance Minister, 
Dr. Manmohan Singh, now the Indian Prime 
Minister.
The economic reforms of 1991 were far-
reaching and opened up India for international 
trade and investment, taxation reforms, 
deregulation and privatization. These reforms 
caused huge cash flows into and out of India 
in the following decades.
The more liberal international trading regime 
established by Singh highlighted the issue of 
Transfer Pricing (TP).The Indian Government, 
like most others, is heavily dependent on tax 
revenue and simply cannot ignore the scope 
for tax avoidance created by transfers between 
subsidiaries of multinational companies. So it 
stepped up in 2001 and amended the Indian 
Income Tax Act of 1961 (via the Finance Act 
of 2001) and added a new chapter titled 
“Chapter X : Special Provisions Relating to 
Avoidance of Tax” and introduced Section 92 
feature 
Vikram Vijayaraghavan
tHE GrEat indian tranSFEr PricinG 
circuS – a criticaL ViEW oF indian 
tP ProViSionS
The laws on transfer pricing in India have created massive uncertainty and a 
spike in litigation. It is time for a new approach.
in Chapter X containing sub-sections 92A to 
92F and Income Tax Rules (Rule 10A-10E) 
laying out specific TP provisions for the first 
time. In other words, the TP circus had begun 
in India.
Indian TP provisions were fairly OECD-like 
in the sense they based the TP regime on 
the arm’s-length principle or ALP (defined 
in Sec.92) of international transactions 
(Sec.92B) between associate enterprises 
(Sec.92A). The computation of ALP was laid 
down via five methods namely Comparable 
Uncontrolled Pricing (CUP), Cost-Plus (CPM), 
Resale Price Method (RPM), Transactional 
Net Margin Method (TNMM) and the Profit-
split Method (recently a new sixth method 
has been prescribed by the Central Board 
of Direct Taxes, the tax administering body). 
Comprehensive documentation requirements 
are laid out in Sec.92D and Sec.92F contains 
all the definitions of the terms. 
There are some important differences 
from OECD TP guidelines. The definition of 
“Associate Enterprise” is quite broad under 
Indian TP compared to OECD; multiple-year 
data of the Financial results of comparable 
companies is not allowed in Indian TP 
except under certain circumstances unlike 
OECD Guidelines; arithmetic mean of 
comparables is used in Indian TP and not 
inter-quartile ranges; Indian TP has stringent 
documentation guidelines while lacking 
guidelines for intra-group set-offs, thin 
capitalization, intangibles etc. all of which are 
in contrast to the OECD guidelines. Here 
are two basic and serious problems with the 
current Indian TP provisions - firstly they 
are too general and vague to be useful laws; 
secondly their implementation has left very 
much to be desired. One worries that the 
first problem is intractable because TP by 
Tax Justice Alchemy, as seen by Martin Rowson  (Reproduced by permission of the author)
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its nature seems to be an economic issue 
that doesn’t lend itself to precise definitions, 
which are essential for legalese and that 
the second problem is unsolvable because 
the ambiguity inherent in TP in general and 
the Indian TP provisions in particular create 
opportunities for misinterpretation, over-
reach and overzealous action. 
Let us look at typical scenario, using the 
fictional multinational ABC to illustrate it. 
ABC (India) Pvt. Ltd. a subsidiary of American 
company ABC Inc., provides software 
development services to its foreign parent, 
a financial analytics application software firm. 
ABC (India) Pvt. Ltd. will likely choose cost-
plus (CPM) and add a markup (say, 15%) to its 
costs. Given there are no benchmark figures 
for comparing the mark-ups in various 
sectors, the Revenue Department will 
normally not accept the taxpayers markup 
%  and hold it as being too low adopting 
TNMM instead. It has become customary 
for the Department to try and apply TNMM 
to all varieties of International Transactions 
given that TNMM method is easy to apply 
without requiring too much precision. The 
Revenue Department will come up with a set 
of comparables to ABC (India) Pvt. Ltd. And 
therein lies the rub.
The comparable list of the Revenue 
Department will typically contain companies 
from the giants such as Infosys™ and TCS™ as 
well as small companies in unrelated software 
verticals (travel, healthcare etc.). These 
comparables make no sense whatsoever in 
the context of ABC; can a software megalith 
with more than 100k employees be compared 
to a 200 people firm? Can unrelated 
software verticals be compared at all? These 
comparables are there simply because proper 
comparables are incredibly hard to find. This is 
more so in a developing country like India 
where industry is still evolving, new industries 
are being opened up and the market hasn’t 
matured completely.
So due to this paucity of comparables, 
the only option in such a case is to take 
the existing comparables and perform 
‘adjustments’. These adjustments are not 
enshrined anywhere and the TP provisions 
are delightfully vague on them! For example 
Rule 10B(e)(iii) on TNMM states 
“(iii)  the net profit margin referred to in sub-
clause (ii) arising in comparable uncontrolled 
transactions is adjusted to take into 
account the differences, if any, between the 
international transaction and the comparable 
uncontrolled transactions, or between the 
enterprises entering into such transactions, 
which could materially affect the amount of 
net profit margin in the open market”. 
What `differences’ are to be accounted 
for and what will `materially affect’ the 
net profit margin is left to the taxpayer to 
substantiate and it is no surprise that the 
Department almost always disagrees. Many 
of the adjustments required such as risk, 
working capital, depreciation, idle capacity 
etc. are totally subjective and result in a 
lot of disputes between the taxpayer and 
Department. Furthermore, there are many 
“filters” applied for rejecting comparables 
such as those having export sales less than 
25% of total revenue, those companies that 
make persistent operating losses and those 
companies that have high turnover and 
super-profits – well, what is super-profit? 
What is high turnover? Surprise, surprise – 
there are no quantifications for these filters 
and the result is the entire exercise often 
devolves into something farcical where the 
Department cherry-picks its comparables 
justifying a high profit % and the assessee 
picks its own set of comparables with a % 
close to its profit % and then both start 
bartering i.e., give and take of comparables. 
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
the comparables are selected on the basis of 
the published financials, which as we all know 
only display the required minimum and so do 
not provide an adequate basis for comparing 
companies.
This is a simplified example and one can 
imagine much more complex scenarios in real 
life. Consider the case of software startups 
– their very USP is being incomparable to 
other companies; consider the cases of firms 
developing and/or trading in intangibles– the 
absence of clear guidelines makes it impossible 
to engage in a fruitful function, risks and assets 
(F.A.R) analysis as prescribed by TP provisions.
These issues with adjustments are not 
restricted to TNMM alone. Even when we 
use other methods, such as CUP, adjustments 
may be required for both internal & external 
CUP causing very much the same confusion. 
Let us take a simple example: a toy company 
EFG India Ltd. exporting toys to its owner 
EFG PLC, UK on bulk contract basis as 
well as selling in the domestic retail market 
in India, has to make adjustments for the 
domestic vs. UK export market, wholesale vs. 
retail (i.e., volume discount) etc. in order to 
apply internal CUP. 
In short, the TP provisions are not simple and 
practical enough to apply in reality and they 
often lead to Pyrrhic victory for either the 
taxpayer or the Department.
And it gets worse. Leaving the conceptual 
issues related to TP such as comparables, filters 
and adjustments, there are numerous practical 
problems in the implementation of Indian TP 
provisions. The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) 
sometimes uses “customs data” blindly, uses 
powers to obtain information directly from 
third-party firms (under Sec.133(6)) without 
sharing the same or proceeding on the basis 
of cursory information obtained, applies 
TNMM incorrectly, discards loss-making 
companies outright etc. In a recent case the 
TPO grabbed customs data directly from the 
Indian customs authorities on coal imports 
without providing detailed information to 
“The Vodafone case relating to capital gains taxation is much 
publicized but it is symptomatic of the general discontent and 
angst at the terrible uncertainty, fickle nature and occasionally 
over-rigorous implementation of taxation provisions in India.”
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the taxpayer; further investigation by the 
taxpayer revealed that the data compared 
coal of completely different calorific values 
and was unsuitable in a number of other 
respects.. 
These kinds of practical issues are common 
in Indian TP practice and combined with the 
theoretical flaws with TP it is no surprise 
that there has been a huge rise in litigation in 
Indian Courts on TP issues. 
All these TP cases wind up in the traffic jam 
that is the judiciary (and quasi-judiciary) 
represented by the Commissioner (Appeals), 
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), 
the High Court (HC) and the Supreme 
Court (SC) . The judiciary, for all its defects, 
is the place of last and often best resort for 
the taxpayer and it has slowly but surely 
pushed for a reasonable interpretation of 
TP provisions. However the entire process 
is uncertain and takes too long a time for 
the taxpayer. To make things worse, we now 
see an aggressive Revenue Department 
which does not wait for outcome of 
judicial proceedings but proceeds to attach 
properties & bank accounts unless some 
portion of the tax demand is paid. So, what 
is a taxpayer to do? The answer depressingly 
seems to be nothing, except to write articles 
such as these and hope for the best.
However, every cloud has a silver lining and 
the uncertainty of TP provisions and the 
Indian taxation regime in general has caused 
tremendous investor and public backlash in 
recent times. The Vodafone case relating to 
capital gains taxation is much publicized but 
it is symptomatic of the general discontent 
and angst at the terrible uncertainty, fickle 
nature and occasionally over-rigorous 
implementation of taxation provisions in 
India. This has led to tremendous pushback 
from those that matter i.e., those with 
money and the leviathan that is the Indian 
Government is slowly waking up.  We recently 
saw some effort in the right directions 
by the Government in the formation of a 
Committee to study safe-harbor rules, in 
introducing a new placeholder section for 
such rules (Sec.92CB), by the introduction of 
Advance Pricing Arrangements (Sec. 92) and 
in prescribing a new TP method (Rule 10AB), 
though defined ambiguously, which basically 
allows use of any method (such as quotes, 
valuations etc.) for purposes of TP.
Frustratingly, we still see retrograde measures 
being introduced in tandem such as specified 
domestic transactions (Sec.92BA) now being 
brought under TP; retrospective amendments 
relating to definition of international 
transaction and to restrict the arm’s-length 
range, introduction of general anti-avoidance 
rules (GAAR). This last was so heavily 
criticized that it has been postponed. 
What is the solution? This author feels 
that a three-pronged approach may work 
– first is to introduce sector-wide safe 
harbors which one believes the Government 
is working on and is great news for the 
industry. This would work by prescribing 
profit %’s for each sector tied to a published 
industry-wide index. Another solution 
is to consider the use of Formulary 
Apportionment (FA) wherever possible in 
addition to ALP – FA is an intuitive formulaic 
sharing approach splitting up the profits 
amongst the group companies across the 
globe. The third solution is of course to 
streamline the current provisions and 
make them more practical and applicable 
– some concrete suggestions are to use 
multiple year data, use inter-quartile ranges, 
to avoid cherry-picking comparables, to not 
discard loss making comparables outright, 
to provide clear and precise guidance on 
adjustments and filters, and to allow select 
technical expert references for comparability 
analysis.
Whether all this will happen is anybody’s 
guess. Unfortunately, from past experience 
one can say that the only certainty in 
Indian taxation is that there will always be 
uncertainty. Combined with the underlying 
ambiguity and hollowness of TP viz. a viz. the 
arm’s-length principle itself what we have 
here is a perfect storm. 
In conclusion, it is clear that TP itself needs 
a fundamental re-think and that the arm’s-
length method while good in theory does 
not pan out well in practice. It is time 
alternative systems in TP are thought 
through and brought to the fore.  It is also 
clear that with respect to Indian taxation, 
the TP provisions are the most important in 
terms of tax revenue as well as one of the 
most controversial and highly litigated tax 
provisions and the pressing need of the hour 
is to reform them and make their language 
and implementation certain and practical for 
the taxpayer. 
Vikram Vijayaraghavan is an Advocate at M/s 
Subbaraya Aiyar, Padmanabhan & Ramamani 
(SAPR) Advocates, Chennai.
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Will the Dodd-Frank Rule about Reporting by Extractive Industry Companies 
lead to More Extensive Country-by-Country Reporting?
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
The information is to be available to the 
public.
The SEC stated that “Congress enacted 
Section 1504 to increase the transparency 
of payments made by oil, natural gas, and 
mining companies to governments for the 
purpose of the commercial development of 
their oil, natural gas and minerals. A primary 
goal of such transparency is to help empower 
citizens of those resource rich countries to 
hold their governments accountable for 
the wealth generated by those resources.” 
Section 1504 increases transparency in order 
to confront corruption in resource rich 
countries and also possible violations under 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by 
extractive resource companies listed publicly 
in the United States.
Such efforts to promote international 
transparency relating to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas or minerals 
are explicitly referred to in Section 1504 
and further the objectives of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
Section 1504 refers explicitly to EITI, and the 
SEC cites EITI frequently in its comments 
about the Rule.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
recently issued the rules (“Rule”) which apply 
for fiscal year ending after September 30, 2013.
The Rule (Rule 13q-1) could be a significant 
first step forward toward country-by-country 
(“CBC”) reporting. However, the type of 
information required by Section 1504 is 
much less than would be required by CBC 
Reporting.  The Rule will make available to the 
public information about the amount of taxes 
received by extractive resource countries 
from companies listed in the United States, 
but the Rule will not require disclosure of 
all of the information and details that CBC 
Reporting would provide.
Country-by-country (“CBC”) Reporting would help determine whether determinations under the OECD’s 
arm’s-length principle of transfer pricing 
are appropriate. CBC Reporting would 
help implement formulary apportionment 
principles for transfer pricing. CBC Reporting 
would therefore constitute a very significant 
transparency rule for transfer pricing 
purposes.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protocol Act (Section 1504) is 
also a transparency rule.  It mandates the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) to issue rules that require each 
resource extraction company publicly listed 
in the United States (“Company”) to provide 
an annual report to the SEC regarding any 
payment made by the Company, by any of its 
subsidiaries or any other entity controlled by 
the Company, to a foreign government for 
the purpose of the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas or minerals. This report 
must include the type and total amount 
of such payments made for each project 
to each government. (Section 13(q) of 
Multinationals risk reputational harm from tax avoidance. Photo: John Christensen
THIRD QuaRTeR 2012  Volume 7 Issue 3 TAX JUSTICE FoCus
11
Therefore, the Rule will not provide the 
answers to all of the questions about transfer 
pricing / transfer mispricing by resource 
extraction companies.  As the disclosure 
requirements of Section 1504 support the 
importance of corporate transparency in tax 
matters, will Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank 
lead to more general CBC Reporting?
The Rules: Definition
Section 1504 and the Rules define the 
relevant terms:
(a) The term “commercial development of 
oil, gas, or minerals” is defined to include 
“exploration, extraction, processing, and 
export of (and other significant actions 
related to) oil, natural gas, or minerals, 
or the acquisition of license for any such 
activity.” (Paragraph (c) (1)).
(b) The term “foreign government” is defined 
broadly as “a foreign government, a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of 
a foreign government, or a company at 
least majority-owned owned by a foreign 
government.”  Foreign government also 
includes “a foreign national government as 
well as a foreign subnational government, 
such as the government of s state, 
province, county, district, municipality, 
or territory under a foreign national 
government.” (paragraph (c) (2)).
(c) The term “payment” is defined (paragraph 
(c) (6)) as an amount paid that
(i) is made to further the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals;
(ii) is not de minimis; and
(iii) includes: (A) Taxes; (B) Royalties; (C) 
Fees; (D) Production entitlements; 
(E) Bonuses; (F) Dividends; and 
(G) Payments for infrastructure 
improvements.
(d) “The term “not de minimis” is defined 
(paragraph (c)(7)) as any payment, 
whether made as a single payment or a 
series of related payments that equals 
or exceeds $100,000.  In the case of 
any arrangement providing for periodic 
payments or installments, a resource 
extraction issuer must consider the 
aggregate amount of the related periodic 
payments or installments of the related 
payments in determining whether the 
payments threshold has been met for 
that series of payments, and accordingly, 
whether disclosure is required.”
iii information to be disclosed by 
the rule
The Company has to disclose annually in a 
report to the SEC (on a new Form SD) the 
following information:
(1) The type and total amount of such 
payments made for each project of the 
resource extraction company relating 
to the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals.
(2) The type and total amount of such 
payments made to each government.
(3) The total amounts of the payments, by 
category (the categories (A) through (G) 
listed above).
(4) The currency used to make payments.
(5) The financial period in which the payments 
were made.
(6) The business segment of the resource 
extraction issuer that made the payments 
(The term “business segment” means a 
business segment consistent with the 
reportable segments used by the resource 
extraction issuer for purposes of financial 
reporting.)
(7) The governments that received the 
payments, and the country in which the 
government is located.
(8) The project (not a defined term) of the 
resource extraction company to which 
the payments relate.
The SEC noted that the Rule does not 
provide an exemption from disclosure in the 
following situations: 
(a) if foreign law prohibits the required 
disclosure of the information.
(b) if the Company has a confidentiality 
provision in a contract .
(c) if the information is commercially sensitive.
(d) if the Company believes that disclosure 
might jeopardize the safety and security 
of its employees and operations. 
The SEC emphasized that any such exemption 
would undermine the effectiveness of the 
Rule.
Resource extraction companies subject 
to the Rule can not satisfy their disclosure 
requirements under Section 1504 by 
providing disclosures required under other 
extractive industry reporting requirements 
such as, for example,  under home country 
laws, listing rules, or an EITI program.
the European union
The EU is considering similar disclosure 
Rules for extractive resource companies.
Summary
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank sets a very 
important precedent about corporate 
transparency but is significantly narrower 
than CBC Reporting. CBC Reporting should 
apply to all companies, not only resource 
extractive companies.  And CBC Reporting 
would require the disclosure of significantly 
more corporate information than Section 
1504 requires.
Full country-by-country reporting
Richard Murphy has described full CBC 
Reporting in the following terms:
• Country-by-Country reporting requires 
the publication of a profit and loss account, 
limited balance sheet and some cash flow 
information for all jurisdictions in which 
a multinational corporation trades, some 
“Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank sets a very important 
precedent about corporate transparency but is 
significantly narrower than CBC Reporting.”
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immaterial locations (when assessed from 
the perspective of the location) excepted;
• That the information disclosed will have 
significant impact on the decisions made 
by investors and other suppliers of capital 
to multinational corporations;
• That in consequence country-by-country 
reporting is material to effective decision 
making on a range of issues including 
a variety of risks, rates of returns, 
governance, tax and the balance between 
short and long term rewards.the 
disclosure required by country-
by-country reporting
Country-by-country reporting would require 
disclosure of the following information by 
each Multinational Corporation (MNC) in its 
annual financial statements:
1. The name of each country in which it 
operates/
2. The names of all its companies trading in 
each country in which it operates/
3. What its financial performance is in every 
country in which it operates, without 
exception, including:
• Its sales, both third party and with 
other group companies.
• Purchases, split between third parties 
and intra-group transaction.
• Labour costs and employee numbers.
• Financing costs split between those 
paid to third parties and to other group 
members.
• Its pre-tax profit.
4. The tax charge included in its account for 
the country in question, split as noted in 
more detail below.
5. Details of the cost and net book value of 
its physical fixed assets located in each 
country.
6. Details of its gross and net assets in total 
for each country in which operates.
country-by-country reporting: 
Shining Light onto Financial 
Statements
Tax information would need to be analysed by 
country in more depth requiring disclosure 
of the following for each country in which 
the corporation operates.
1. The tax charge for the year split between 
current and deferred tax.
2. The actual tax payments made to the 
governments of the country in the period.
3. The liabilities (and assets, if relevant) 
owing for tax and equivalent charges at 
the beginning and end of each accounting 
period.
In addition, if the company operated within 
the extractive industries we would also 
expect to see a full breakdown of all those 
benefits (including of course taxes and 
other payments) paid to the government 
of each country in which a multinational 
corporation operates, broken down between 
these categories of reporting required in the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
(See also “Country-by-Country Reporting: 
Shining Light Onto Financial Statements,” by 
Richard Murphy on behalf of the Tax Justice 
Network,)
David Spencer, a Senior Adviser to the Tax 
Justice Network, is an attorney in New York 
specializing in tax law and banking law. He is 
a frequent author about international financial 
law issues, in Journal of International Taxation 
and International Financial Law Review, and is 
on the Board of Advisers of both journals.
“A primary goal of such transparency is to help empower 
citizens of those resource rich countries to hold their 
governments accountable for the wealth generated by those 
resources.”
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As work on FSI 2013 was beginning in October 2012, a new  White Paper was published, outlining 
various approaches for identifying secrecy 
jurisdictions based on their FSI secrecy score. 
In addition, a few minor changes have been 
suggested for the 2013 FSI, as detailed below. 
The 2013 FSI will cover 82 jurisdictions 
(up from 73 in 2011), including three 
jurisdictions with financial centre ambitions 
(Curacao instead of Netherlands Antilles, 
and the Dominican Republic and New 
Zealand) and seven jurisdictions chosen on 
the basis of their being among the global 
top 30 providers of cross border financial 
services as identified through the FSI 2011 
methodology (Australia, Norway, Brazil, 
Sweden, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa). Furthermore, a new Watch List 
with eight jurisdictions (Anjouan/Comoros, 
BES- Islands, Campione d’Italia, Djibouti, 
Niue, Qatar, Sint Maarten and Vatican) will 
be created and published alongside the FSI-
listing. The jurisdictions included in the Watch 
List are those which are not fully monitored 
financial secrecy index
Moran Harari & Markus Meinzer
FirSt StEPS toWardS  
FSi 2013
Following the launch of the second Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) in October 
2011, consultations and discussions with researchers and stakeholders have 
taken place in order to review the FSI. 
due to their uncertain and/or small scale of 
secrecy service provision.
A new three tier measurement will be 
integrated to Indicator 2 regarding trusts 
and foundations. According to the 
current situation, all jurisdictions receive full 
secrecy scores because they do not require 
registration of trusts/foundations in every 
case. However, this may be seen as unfair by 
civil law jurisdictions which sometimes may at 
best “passively” tolerate local lawyers to act 
as trustees. Therefore, for the FSI 2013 a three 
tiered secrecy score (full, two third and one 
third) will take into consideration not only 
a jurisdiction‘s requirement for compulsory 
and public registration of trusts, but also if a 
jurisdiction’s laws provide for trust creation 
and if a jurisdiction ratified the 1985 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts 
and on Their Recognition. 
Furthermore, there will be a new merged 
FSi/SJ website, which is currently 
developed and monitored by the FSI team. 
Finally, regarding the outreach process, a 
training session for all interested in the 
use of the FSI 2013 will take place as part 
of a TJN-research conference (July 2013). A 
survey among activists will be carried out in 
November 2012 to find out needs and wishes 
for the training and to ask all interested to 
make time for monthly phone conferences 
commencing in January 2013. The launch 
date for 2013 FSI is provisionally scheduled 
for the beginning of November 2013, to be 
confirmed three months in advance.
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
FSI_2012_Cut-Off-Point.pdf
http://taxjustice.blogspot.co.il
Moran Harari (moran@taxjustice.net) is a 
lawyer working with Tax Justice Network (TJN) 
on the financial secrecy index (FSI). Markus 
Meinzer (markus@taxjustice.net) is directing 
the research on the FSI at TJN-IS.
Secrecy isn’t limited to palm-treed islands  
Photo: John Christensen 
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A self-confessed wordaholic, I’ve 
spent my working life with at least 
four dictionaries within easy reach, 
and this is a helpful further addition 
to my desk.  TJN places great value 
on our ability to communicate 
new ideas, and words, especially 
those with contested meanings, are 
essential parts of our toolkit for 
change. 
Take tax avoidance, for example.  The 
general argument holds that because 
its legal it’s acceptable if not an out 
and out good thing.  In his dictionary 
entry James cites the famous opinion 
given in 1929 by Lord Clyde: “No 
man in this country is under the 
smallest obligation, moral or other, 
so to arrange his legal relations to 
his business or to his property so as 
to enable the Inland Revenue to put 
the largest shovel into his stores.” 
But then he also cites Lord Denning, 
reviews
A Dictionary of Taxation (2nd Edition)
Simon James and Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK
Xlibris Corporation, 2005
Review by John Christensen  
‘The avoidance of tax may be lawful, 
but it is not yet a virtue’ (1969), and 
– my favourite – Lord Templeman: 
“Every tax avoidance scheme 
involves a trick and a pretence.  It is 
the task of the revenue to unravel 
the trick, and the duty of the court is 
to ignore the pretence.” (1994).  In 
citing these opinions, James shows 
that some words cannot be defined 
with absolute confidence: there is 
no such thing as a “proper meaning” 
for the term avoidance when used in 
the context of tax, and a large part 
of TJN’s project is precisely to make 
tax avoidance less acceptable and 
more of a pejorative term.
Tax competition is another 
interesting example of a contested 
word.  The orthodox position 
is that all competition is a good 
thing, ergo tax competition is just 
splendid.  From a critical perspective, 
however, tax competition is 
a political construct used to 
undermine democracy and subsidise 
capital. James tackles the issue as 
follows:
Tax Competition. Competition 
between different tax jurisdictions 
in the form of tax concessions 
designed to attract businesses, 
individuals and investment to their 
area.  See also race to the bottom 
model.
It’s that final cross reference, plus 
the list of recommended further 
reading, which invites the reader to 
explore the history and complexity 
of the possible meanings of tax 
competition.  The author is right in 
not seeking to impose a resolution 
on a disputed ideological construct, 
but while resolution is unlikely to be 
achievable in the foreseeable future, 
it is helpful to raise awareness of 
the nature of the dispute and the 
possible different meanings.  
The new Dictionary of Taxation, which 
has been significantly expanded since 
its first edition, is filled with similar 
examples that convey a sense of the 
complexities and changing dynamics 
of the human construct known 
as tax. While the focus is largely, if 
not entirely, on words, concepts, 
court rulings from the English-
speaking world, it provides a useful 
reference point for anyone with a 
research or professional interest in 
the subject.   And here’s hoping that 
“The avoidance of tax may be lawful, 
but it is not yet a virtue.”
by the time the author gets round 
to revising for the third edition, the 
entries for words such as avoidance, 
competition, ethics and arm’s length 
will have acquired new meanings 
with greater emphasis on tax justice.
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American multinationals under 
pressure over UK corporation tax
According to a Reuters report 
Starbucks has sold £3 billion worth 
of coffee in the UK since 1998, but 
has paid only £8.6 in tax on profits. 
For the last three years it has paid 
no corporation tax at all on its UK 
operations, while describing them 
as ‘profitable’ in calls to financial 
analysts. Starbucks joins Facebook, 
Ebay and Amazon in a growing 
list of multinationals whose tax 
arrangements in the UK have 
attracted publicity.
A UK Uncut spokesman told the 
Guardian that ‘companies such as 
Starbucks are definitely targets 
in our sights for future protests. 
UK Uncut’s previous sit-ins and 
occupations in the branches of tax 
dodgers have proved very effective 
in highlighting the unjust practices of 
big business’.
Capital Flight – New Figures for 
North Africa
In October the Political Economy 
Research Institute (PERI) published 
‘Capital Flight from North African 
Countries’ by Léonce Ndikumana 
news in brief…
and James K. Boyce.  Ndikumana and 
Boyce estimate that Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia lost $453.6 
billion to capital flight between 
1970 and 2010 (calculated in 2010 
dollars). 
The authors conclude that ‘that 
capital flight is a serious economic, 
social and political-economy 
problem in North African countries 
... It is a source of social inequity 
that is likely to feature prominently 
on the policy agenda of the North 
African governments in the post-
revolution era’. 
The United Nations Tax Committee: 
OECD vs The Rest of the World
The eighth session of the UN 
Tax Committee, held in Geneva in 
October, saw a further drift away 
from the dominance of OECD 
interests. First, the Committee 
agreed its new practical manual on 
transfer pricing which allows room 
for manouevre in tackling transfer 
pricing issues, and, second, it agreed 
to proceed with drafting a new 
article for its model convention that 
will make provision for countries to 
tax payments for technical services, 
management and consultancy 
fees, made to persons resident in 
third party countries.  This could 
potentially become an important 
mechanism for blocking profits 
shifting to tax havens.  This was 
the final session of the current 
Committee: a new committee 
will be appointed in 2013 and TJN 
has been encouraging non-OECD 
countries to nominate experts for 
the new committee to redress the 
current political imbalance within 
the Committee of Experts, which 
has a bias towards the interests of 
OECD countries.
Price of Offshore Revisited
In July the Tax Justice Network 
published an update of its landmark 
report, ‘The Price of Offshore’. This 
new edition authored by James 
Henry, a former chief economist for 
McKinsey, estimates that liquid capital 
worth between £13tn and £20tn has 
found its way into tax havens. He 
told the Observer that this offshore 
wealth is ‘protected by a highly paid, 
industrious bevy of professional 
enablers in the private banking, 
legal, accounting and investment 
industries taking advantage of the 
increasingly borderless, frictionless 
global economy’.
Another Fine Mess
The Formula 1 racing team McLaren 
has persuaded a UK tax tribunal that 
a £49 million penalty imposed by the 
sports governing body, the FIA, could 
be treated as a reduction in gross 
income rather than as a fine. McLaren 
successfully argued that the payment, 
made after the company was found 
to be in possession of an 800-page 
document belonging to rivals Ferrari, 
was a business expense that could be 
written off against tax.
Australia
In October Australia ratified the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance on 
Tax Matters. Assistant Treasurer 
David Bradbury said that ‘ratifying 
the Convention underlines the 
Government’s long-standing 
commitment to international 
cooperation to help prevent tax 
avoidance and evasion’. 
Tax Havens and the US Presidential 
Elections
An investigation by the Tax Justice 
Network’s Nick Shaxson in the 
August edition of Vanity Fair shone 
a bright light on Mitt Romney’s 
extensive offshore connections 
and brought the issue of tax havens 
to a new prominence in the run-
up to the Presidential elections in 
November.
HSBC’s Mexican Connection
In July the US Senate Permanent 
Sub-Committee on Investigations 
published ‘US Vulnerabilities to 
Money Laundering, Drugs and 
Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case 
History’. Senator Carl Levin 
described how  ‘HSBC used its 
U.S. bank as a gateway into the U.S. 
financial system for some HSBC 
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news in brief (contd)
affiliates around the world to 
provide U.S. dollar services to clients 
while playing fast and loose with U.S. 
banking rules … HBUS exposed 
the United States to Mexican drug 
money, suspicious travelers cheques, 
bearer share corporations, and 
rogue jurisdictions.’
On Monday July 16th Levin 
complained that the bank’s 
‘compliance culture’ had been 
‘pervasively polluted for a long time’ 
and called for ‘tough regulation’ by 
the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC). The bank’s 
head of compliance, David Bagley, 
resigned on July 17th. 
Tax and Development
The House of Commons 
International Development 
Committee published ‘Tax in 
Developing Countries: Increasing 
Resources for Development’ 
in July 2012. The Committee’s 
recommendations include country-
by-country accounting for UK-
based multinationals and steps to 
tackle transfer pricing abuse.
